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Abstract 
This paper considers a spatial discrimination Cournot model with asymmetric demand. We use the geographical 
interpretation of the linear market and introduce differentiated products. We analyze a location-quantity game and 
show that agglomeration or dispersed locations may arise, depending on parameter combinations. The degree of 
differentiation plays an important role in location choice if the demand is asymmetric. The higher the degree of 
differentiation between the products the more likely is agglomeration. Only cases with a low degree of differentiation 
and a relatively low difference in market size leads to the absence of agglomeration in the larger market.
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     1. Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Hotelling (1929) spatial models have received consistent
attention by economists to answer the question whether ﬁrms would agglomerate or disperse.
If ﬁrms compete in prices most theoretical models of spatial competition have found that ﬁrms
will never agglomerate.1 The reason is that price competition drives proﬁts down to zero as the
locations of ﬁrms offering identical products become nearer.
In the case of quantity competition, with full coverage of the market, Anderson and Neven
(1991) and Hamilton et al. (1989) obtain that the equilibrium location of ﬁrms is characterized
by agglomeration in the middle of the linear market. Both approaches use a linear market with
a uniform distribution of consumers. In this context, it is obvious to interpret this model as a
geographical location model, instead of a model with varying consumer tastes. Shimizu (2002)
analyzes the inﬂuence of product differentiation in a location-quantity model with a uniform
distribution of consumers and obtains the result that agglomeration in the center of the market
remains unaffected by the degree of differentiation.
Gupta et al. (1997) use a location-quantity model with nonuniform consumer distribution
and show that agglomeration occurs under a wide variety of consumer distributions. However,
these authors show as well that dispersed equilibria are also consistent with Cournot compe-
tition. Liang et al. (2006) use a barbell a la Hwang and Mai (1990) and derive the inﬂuence
of asymmetric demand on location choice. These authors show that agglomeration occurs if
transportation costs are relatively low and dispersion occurs if transportation is relatively costly.
It is the purpose of this paper to answer the question if location choice, and thereby ag-
glomeration, is affected by product differentiation in a spatial Cournot model with asymmetric
demand or if Shimizu´s result remains stable that agglomeration is unaffected by the degree
of differentiation between the products. Our analysis indicates that the degree of product dif-
ferentiation has an important inﬂuence on agglomeration in the spatial Cournot model with
asymmetric demand.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the spatial Cournot model with
asymmetric demand and product differentiation. Section 3 concludes.
2. Model
Following Hwang and Mai, the spatial structure is a line ranging from 0 to 1. Markets are
concentrated in two locations connected by a transportation route, e.g. a highway. The mar-
kets are located at the endpoints of the line and the population density between these spatially
separated markets is zero. To obtain an asymmetric demand structure, we have to assume that
market 1 and market 2 represent different market sizes. Such models have been used to explain
intra-industry trade in international trade theory2, but could be applied to regional markets
inside a country as well, for example two cities connected with a highway.
There are two ﬁrms A and B that produce at constant marginal production cost (zero without
loss of generality). Each ﬁrm faces linear transportation costs of t to move one unit of output
one unit of distance. Further, we assume that t  1
2 in order to ensure that both ﬁrms serve
the whole market. Firms are able to discriminate between consumers in both markets since
they control transportation. We assume that consumer arbitrage is prohibitively costly. The
locations of the ﬁrms are denoted by xj (j=A, B). Without loss of generality, we assume that
1See, e.g., d’Aspremont et al. (1979) and Hamilton et al. (1989).
2See, e.g., Neven and Phlips (1985).
1ﬁrm A locates to the left of ﬁrm B, i.e. xA  xB: Further, we assume that ﬁrms compete in
quantities.
We consider the following two stage game: in the ﬁrst stage, the two ﬁrms simultaneously
choose their locations. In the second stage, both ﬁrms select simultaneously their quantities,
given the location decision. The game is solved by backward induction.
The ﬁrms face a demand curve expressing the price of their product in terms of the produc-























i is the delivered price in market i (i=1,2) by ﬁrm j (j=A,B) and the demanded




i (-j=A,B and  j 6= j), a and g are positive
constants and the relative market size is denoted by g. If g > 1, market 1 is relatively larger
than market 2, to simplify the analysis, we assume that this condition is always satisﬁed.
The degree of differentiation between the products is denoted as q: We set q 2 (0;1], to an-
alyze the case of substitutes, where q = 1 corresponds to completely homogeneous products.3


































4 q2(2 q  2t +qt +2txj qtx j): (5)
In the ﬁrst stage each ﬁrms selects a proﬁt-maximizing location given the rival´s location.















(q2 4)2 > 0: (7)
The proﬁt function for ﬁrm j is strictly convex with respect to location xj, see (7), which
suggests a corner solution. The Nash equilibrium location can be obtained by comparing the
proﬁts at the two corners. Because of the assumption xA  xB, we consider three possible
solutions (xA;xB) = (0;0), (0,1) and (1,1).
3We exclude the case q = 0, since this implies that products are completely differentiated, each producer is
then a monopolist of its own brand.
4Equilibrium values are marked with “*” in the superscript.
2Comparison of ﬁrm A’s proﬁts yields:
PA(0;1) PA(1;1) =
4at
(q2 4)2(2g  2+t  tg +q  gq +tqg) > 0: (8)
It follows that, proﬁts are necessarily higher to ﬁrm A, if it locates in market 1. Note that
this result holds for all values of the degree of differentiation.
Given ﬁrm A locates in market 1, comparison of ﬁrm B´s proﬁts can be written as:
PB(0;0) PB(0;1) =  
4at
(q2 4)2( 2g +2 t  q +qg +qt +gt): (9)
From (9) we can see that, in the ﬁrst stage, the solution can be either (0,0) or (0,1), depend-
ing on parameter combinations. Two effects affect the location decision of ﬁrm B: the demand
effect moves ﬁrm B to market 1, while the competition effect pushes ﬁrm B away from ﬁrm A.






We sum up the equilibrium locations of the ﬁrms in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, ﬁrm A locates at x










Since it is the purpose of this paper to explore the impact of product differentiation on
agglomeration in the barbell-model, we take a closer look at condition (10). The effect of





(q  1+g)2 < 0: (11)
The derivative (11) shows that a lower degree of differentiation, i.e. a higher value of q; leads
to a lower critical value of agglomeration in market 1 and hence agglomeration occurs for a
smaller range of parameter combinations compared to a higher degree of differentiation, i.e. a
lower value of q. The reason for this is that the competition effect declines with rising degree of
differentiationandthereforetheincentivetochoosealocationinthelargermarketincreasesand
agglomeration becomes more likely. This result is different from the one derived by Shimizu
(2002), who could prove that with a uniform distribution of consumers on a linear market
and differentiated products, agglomeration occurs at the center independently of the degree of
differentiation.
To illustrate the effect of product differentiation, we calculate numerical values for (10).
The results are reported in Table 1.
The interpretation of these critical values of agglomeration for the transportation cost is
the following, all transportation cost rates below the critical value imply agglomeration, while
transportation cost rates above these values result in dispersed ﬁrm locations. Note that the
highest possible value of t equals .5. All values in Table 1 that are higher than .5 are high-
lighted in italics since they imply agglomeration for all combinations of t, q and g in that
respective cell. The case of homogeneous products (as in Liang et al. (2006)) corresponds to
3x q ng ! 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
.1 .95 1.27 1.43 1.52 1.58 1.63 1.66 1.69 1.71 1.73
.2 .60 .90 1.08 1.20 1.29 1.35 1.40 1.44 1.47 1.50
.3 .43 .68 .85 .97 1.06 1.13 1.19 1.24 1.28 1.31
.4 .32 .53 .69 .80 .89 .96 1.02 1.07 1.11 1.14
.5 .25 .43 .56 .67 .75 .82 .88 .92 .96 1.00
.6 .20 .35 .47 .56 .64 .70 .75 .80 .84 .88
.7 .16 .29 .39 .47 .54 .60 .65 .69 .73 .76
.8 .13 .24 .33 .40 .46 .51 .56 .60 .64 .67
.9 .11 .20 .28 .34 .39 .44 .48 .52 .55 .58
1 .09 .17 .23 .29 .33 .38 .41 .44 .47 .50
Table 1: Simulated critical values of agglomeration.
the case of the last row q = 1. Two effects are obvious; ﬁrst; increasing market size in market
1 leads to a higher critical value,5 and therefore agglomeration occurs for a larger set of values,
second; as shown in (11), increasing product differentiation leads to a higher critical value and
agglomeration is more likely. The simulated critical values show that only dispersed ﬁrm loca-
tions exist if the relative difference in market size and the degree of product differentiation is
low.
3. Conclusion
We show that in contrast to the result derived by Shimizu (2002) for a linear market with
uniform distributed consumers, the degree of differentiation plays an important role in location
choice if the demand is asymmetric since our results differ signiﬁcantly from the results of
Liang et al. (2006), who analysed a similar model with homogeneous goods. The higher the
degree of differentiation between the products the more likely is agglomeration. Only cases
with a low degree of differentiation and a relatively low difference in market size leads to the
absence of agglomeration in the larger market.
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